When Hermann Simon, the renowned German economist best known for his scholarship on the Mittelstand and global market-leading niche enterprises, argues that China remains the best choice for German companies, the statement cannot be dismissed as mere commercial optimism. It must instead be evaluated against the dense legal, regulatory, and geopolitical environment that now governs cross-border investment between Europe’s largest economy and the world’s second-largest. At stake is not simply market access, but the recalibration of technological sovereignty, industrial policy, and regulatory risk in an increasingly fragmented global order.
China’s contemporary policy framework is anchored in a deliberate shift from high-speed growth to what policymakers describe as high-quality development. This transition is embedded in the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced through industrial strategies that prioritise advanced manufacturing, digital transformation, green transition, and domestic innovation capacity. For German firms specialising in precision engineering, automotive technology, chemicals, and industrial automation, these priorities intersect directly with their comparative advantages. Yet the opportunity landscape is inseparable from the legal architecture that shapes market participation.
The Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, which entered into force in 2020, formally replaced earlier joint venture statutes and introduced a pre-establishment national treatment regime combined with a negative list approach. In principle, this framework aligns more closely with international investment standards by reducing explicit sectoral discrimination. However, practical market entry remains conditioned by regulatory licensing, cybersecurity compliance obligations under the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law, and increasing scrutiny under the Anti-Espionage Law as amended in 2023. German corporations operating research and development centres in China must therefore navigate a compliance landscape that extends beyond commercial law into national security-sensitive domains.
Simultaneously, European regulatory developments shape the calculus. The European Union has adopted a Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation that empowers Member States to review inbound investments on security grounds. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism impose additional compliance burdens on firms with complex supply chains. Germany’s own Supply Chain Due Diligence Act requires companies above defined thresholds to conduct human rights and environmental risk assessments across global operations. Thus, engagement with China now involves managing a dual regulatory exposure, one rooted in Beijing’s industrial and security framework and another in Brussels and Berlin’s evolving standards.
The geopolitical dimension further complicates the assessment. The United States has expanded export controls on advanced semiconductors and related technologies under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and associated regulations administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security. German firms that incorporate United States origin technology into their products may find themselves subject to extraterritorial restrictions when exporting to Chinese customers. This creates a triangular compliance challenge in which German companies must reconcile Chinese industrial policy incentives with United States technology controls and European strategic autonomy debates.
Yet Simon’s argument rests on structural fundamentals. China remains the world’s largest automotive market and a leading arena for electric vehicle deployment and renewable energy expansion. German automotive manufacturers have invested heavily in joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries, while chemical and engineering firms continue to expand production facilities. The scale of domestic demand, the depth of supply chains and the rapid pace of technological iteration create an innovation ecosystem that few markets can replicate.
The critical question is whether technological self reliance in China translates into exclusionary industrial nationalism or into a more sophisticated partnership model. Policies aimed at reducing dependence on foreign core technologies, particularly in semiconductors and advanced machinery, inevitably generate competitive pressures for foreign suppliers. However, they also create demand for collaboration in areas where domestic capability remains maturing. Winning in this environment requires localisation of research, integration into Chinese digital platforms and rigorous compliance governance rather than simple export orientation.
From a legal perspective, the sustainability of German corporate presence in China depends on predictability of regulatory enforcement, dispute resolution mechanisms and the integrity of intellectual property protection. China has strengthened its specialised intellectual property courts and amended its Patent Law and Copyright Law in recent years to increase statutory damages and enhance enforcement. Nevertheless, concerns regarding technology transfer expectations and data localisation obligations persist in boardrooms across Europe.
The proposition that China remains the best choice is therefore neither naïve nor guaranteed. It is a strategic judgement that the combination of market scale, industrial upgrading and policy driven innovation outweighs regulatory and geopolitical risk. For German companies whose competitive identity is rooted in engineering excellence and long term market cultivation, disengagement would entail forfeiting participation in one of the most dynamic arenas of industrial transformation.
Ultimately, the debate transcends bilateral trade flows. It concerns whether global economic integration can endure amid intensifying regulatory sovereignty. German firms stand at the intersection of competing legal regimes and strategic narratives. If they succeed in navigating compliance complexity while leveraging China’s industrial evolution, they may validate Simon’s assessment. If fragmentation deepens into systemic decoupling, the cost of strategic exposure may rise. The outcome will hinge not only on economic fundamentals, but on the capacity of legal frameworks in Beijing, Berlin and Brussels to accommodate interdependence within an era defined by technological power politics