Japan has announced it is actively seeking alternative oil supply routes to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz as the Iran war continues. It sounds like a policy response. It is also, when you examine the numbers, a statement about a country facing one of the most acute energy security crises of any major economy on earth — because Japan’s alternatives to Hormuz are real, limited, expensive, and none of them comes close to replacing what the strait normally provides.
Here is the complete picture.
How dependent is Japan on Hormuz
Japan imports more than 95% of its oil from the Middle East, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia each providing 40% of Japan’s total imports. The Strait of Hormuz is the only sea route that can move oil, natural gas, and other cargo out of the Persian Gulf, including 93% of Japan’s oil imports. About 70% of Japan’s Middle Eastern oil is delivered by ships that pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
To put that in perspective — Japan is the world’s fourth largest economy and one of its most industrialised nations. It runs on imported energy. Japan relies on fossil fuels for around 80% of its energy needs. There is no domestic oil. There is no meaningful domestic gas. The lights stay on, factories run, and cars move because tankers arrive from the Gulf. When the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed on February 28, Japan’s energy supply chain did not develop a problem. It lost its primary artery.
What Japan has done immediately — the reserves buffer
The first and most important response was not finding new supply. It was buying time with existing stockpiles. Japan has one of the largest oil buffers in the world — 470 million barrels stockpiled, comprising 254 days of domestic demand, split between 146 days in the national stockpile, 101 days in mandatory private stockpiles, and 7 days in a reserve program with Middle Eastern producers. On March 16, the Japanese government began releasing 80 million barrels — equivalent to 45 days of domestic demand — to mitigate panic and minimise economic disruption. As of March 2026, Japanese companies also held 4 million tonnes of LNG inventories, roughly 3 weeks of total consumption.
254 days of oil reserves is an extraordinary buffer by global standards and reflects decades of Japanese energy security policy built around exactly this kind of scenario. It means Japan can survive the Hormuz closure without running out of oil for the better part of a year — but it cannot survive it indefinitely, and every day the strait remains effectively closed is a day the buffer gets smaller.
Alternative route one — Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port via the East-West pipeline
This is the most immediately available bypass. Saudi Arabia operates the East-West crude oil pipeline running from its Abqaiq oil processing centre near the Persian Gulf to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea coast — entirely bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Aramco temporarily expanded the pipeline’s capacity to 7 million barrels per day in 2019 by converting some natural gas liquids pipelines. In 2024, Saudi Arabia pumped more crude through this pipeline to avoid Bab al-Mandeb shipping disruptions.
A tanker carrying crude oil from Yanbu arrived in Ehime Prefecture in western Japan in early April, confirming the route is operationally viable. Crude oil shipments bypassing the Strait of Hormuz from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port are expected to arrive in Japan regularly from May. Japan’s Industry Minister Ryosei Akazawa held online meetings with Saudi and UAE ministers asking for smooth shipment processes.
The limitation is capacity. The East-West pipeline is already heavily utilised and is being asked to carry more by every Asian country simultaneously seeking the same bypass. It can partially compensate — not fully replace — Hormuz-dependent Saudi volumes.
Alternative route two — UAE’s Fujairah port via the ADCO pipeline
The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which runs from onshore fields to Fujairah port on the Gulf of Oman — outside the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Ships loading at Fujairah do not need to enter the strait at all. Fujairah port in the UAE, just outside the Strait of Hormuz in the open sea, can be used to ship crude oil without going through the strait, although the capacity is limited. The pipeline’s capacity is approximately 1.5 million barrels per day — meaningful but a fraction of what normally moves through Hormuz.
Alternative route three — North America
Japan Petroleum Association President Shunichi Kito said North America is one potential alternative source of crude, with Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico also seen as possible options. Japanese oil companies are exploring procurement options from various countries and dispatching vessels to them. Procurement of crude oil is the top priority even if soaring freight rates and insurance fees incur higher costs. Kito also suggested Japan should consider investing in crude oil production in Alaska to diversify supply in the long term.
The practical reality is that American, Canadian, and Latin American crude travels significantly further to reach Japan than Gulf crude does, adding weeks to delivery times and considerably more to shipping costs. The oil grades are also different — Japanese refineries are configured to process Middle Eastern crude, and switching feedstock grades requires time and investment to optimise. North America is a viable emergency supplement. It is not a structural replacement.
Alternative route four — Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
Major Japanese resources developer Inpex Corporation plans to prioritise selling crude oil produced in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Japanese firms. Japan has existing production interests in the Caspian region through Inpex, and Kazakh and Azerbaijani crude can move westward through Russian pipelines and Turkish ports without touching the Gulf at all. This route is geopolitically complex given Russia’s role in the transit infrastructure, but it represents a genuine alternative supply source that Japan can draw on without Hormuz dependency.
Alternative route five — negotiating IRGC passage directly
Iran said Japanese ships will be allowed to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi told Japan’s Kyodo News: “We have not closed the strait. It is closed only to ships belonging to our enemies. For other countries, ships can pass through the strait. We are talking to them to find a way to pass safely.”
Japan, which has maintained diplomatic relations with Iran throughout the conflict and has been careful not to take sides publicly, is in a better position than most US allies to negotiate IRGC passage. Two Japanese LNG tankers reportedly passed through the strait in early April. The limitation is that IRGC-permitted passage is selective, fee-based, and revocable — it is not a permanent solution and depends entirely on the political relationship between Tokyo and Tehran remaining workable.
Alternative route six — strategic stockpile releases and IEA coordination
Japan has already triggered its strategic reserve release and is coordinating with the International Energy Agency on collective responses. The IEA’s emergency response mechanism allows member countries to collectively release reserves to stabilise markets, and Japan — as one of the IEA’s most significant members — is both a major beneficiary and a major contributor to that process.
What none of these alternatives can do
Here is the honest assessment. Most volumes that transit the strait have no alternative means of exiting the region. We estimate that about 2.6 million barrels per day of capacity from the Saudi and UAE pipelines could be available to bypass the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a supply disruption. Japan normally receives the equivalent of several million barrels per day of Middle Eastern oil. The pipeline bypass capacity covers a fraction of that. North American and Central Asian crude can supplement but not replace. IRGC-permitted passage is temporary and politically contingent.
Japan’s Petroleum Association president said the crisis should serve as an opportunity for Japan to diversify supply sources in the long term — but long-term is the operative phrase. The infrastructure, contracts, refinery configurations, and shipping logistics required to fundamentally reduce Japan’s Hormuz dependency cannot be built in weeks or even months. They require years of deliberate investment and policy commitment.
Japan has 254 days of reserves, a Yanbu tanker already docked in Ehime, IRGC negotiations underway, Inpex redirecting Kazakh crude, and North American options being explored. It is doing everything available to it. And it is still fundamentally dependent on a 21-mile-wide channel between Iran and Oman that it has no control over and no adequate replacement for.
That is Japan’s energy reality on April 10, 2026. And it is a version of the same reality facing China, India, South Korea, and most of Asia simultaneously.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Energy market and geopolitical data is drawn from EIA, IEA, CSIS, and publicly available sources. Readers are advised to consult a SEBI-registered financial advisor before making any investment decisions. Business Upturn is not responsible for any decisions made based on this article.