Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baqaei has issued a clarification on Saturday that significantly reframes what appeared to be a full Hormuz closure — stating that Iran has not closed the Strait of Hormuz but reserves the right to prevent aggressive actions by enemy forces and will not allow enemy ships to use the waterway under normal passage conditions.
The clarification is critically important and needs to be read with precision, because what Baqaei has described is not a closure of the Strait to all shipping — it is a selective restriction that targets US and Israeli vessels specifically while commercial traffic from other nations remains, at least in principle, permitted to transit.
What Baqaei Actually Said — Parsed Line by Line
“We did NOT close the Strait” — this directly contradicts the earlier military command statement that appeared to announce a full closure and is Iran’s official Foreign Ministry position superseding the military’s framing.
“We have the right to prevent aggressive actions of the enemy” — this is Iran asserting sovereign authority to take defensive measures against forces it considers hostile, without characterising those measures as a closure of the waterway itself.
“We CANNOT allow enemy ships to use the Strait and enjoy normal passage” — this is the operational definition of what Iran is actually doing. Enemy ships — meaning US Navy vessels and Israeli military assets — will be blocked. Commercial vessels from third countries are a separate category.
“We know they will STRIKE at us” — this is Iran’s stated justification for the restriction. Tehran is arguing that allowing US naval vessels free passage through the Strait under the current blockade conditions is equivalent to allowing the instrument of its own strangulation to operate freely in its backyard.
What This Means in Practical Terms
The distinction Baqaei is drawing is between a full closure — which would block all shipping including commercial tankers, cargo vessels and LNG carriers from every nation — and a targeted restriction on US and Israeli military vessels specifically, while commercial traffic continues on the coordinated route previously announced by the Ports and Maritime Organisation of Iran.
If this distinction holds in practice, the crude oil market impact is significantly different from a full closure. Commercial tankers carrying Saudi, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, UAE and other Gulf producers’ oil to Asia and Europe can still transit. The supply shock that drove Brent above $100 was caused by the near-complete closure of commercial traffic — not by restrictions on US Navy movements through the Strait.
The practical question is whether the US Navy’s blockade enforcement vessels — which CENTCOM has deployed specifically to intercept ships entering and leaving Iranian ports — fall within the category of “enemy ships” that Iran is now saying will be blocked. If Iran attempts to physically prevent US naval vessels from operating in the Strait, the ceasefire becomes a direct naval confrontation rather than a diplomatic standoff.
The Blockade Is the Trigger
Baqaei’s statement makes the causation explicit — Iran is restricting US vessel passage in direct response to the continuation of the American naval blockade of Iranian ports. Tehran’s position is that it cannot allow the same naval force that is economically strangling Iran to freely use the waterway that Iran considers within its sovereign security perimeter.
This is the same argument that has been at the core of the Iran-US standoff since the blockade came into effect on April 13. Iran declared the Hormuz open on Friday evening as a goodwill gesture. The US maintained the blockade. Iran’s military then announced a closure. The Foreign Ministry is now walking that back to a more precise formulation — not closed to all, closed to the enemy specifically.
Where This Leaves the Diplomacy
Baqaei’s clarification actually opens more space for diplomacy than the blunt military closure statement did. A full closure of the Strait to all commercial traffic is a maximalist position that leaves no room for negotiation without complete capitulation from one side. A targeted restriction on US and Israeli vessels, framed as a defensive right rather than a punitive closure, gives Pakistan’s mediators something to work with.
The question for Asim Munir’s meetings with Araghchi in Tehran today is whether a formula can be found under which the US agrees to some modification of the blockade’s enforcement posture — not lifting it entirely, but perhaps creating a mechanism that addresses Iran’s stated concern about enemy ships operating freely — while Iran maintains the commercial Strait opening that Friday’s oil market reaction showed the world desperately wants to see.
Trump said most points are already negotiated. The Hormuz-blockade interface is clearly not among them. That gap — how to simultaneously maintain American pressure on Iran through the blockade while allowing Iran the security assurance that US strike assets cannot freely approach through its controlled waterway — is what the next 48 hours of diplomacy needs to bridge before the ceasefire runs out.
The Strait is open. Except to the enemy. Which happens to be the country running the blockade.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Geopolitical situations are subject to rapid change. Readers are advised to follow official government communications for the most current verified information on this developing situation.