After Kaveri, India again witnesses failure with the recent Tapas saga!

In the annals of defence technology development, few narratives are as poignant as that of the Tapas BH-201 drone, conceived with lofty aspirations but ultimately marred by a litany of setbacks and disappointments. Embarked upon by the Defense Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Aeronautical Development Establishment in Bengaluru back in February 2011, this Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone was envisioned as a beacon of innovation and strategic prowess.

The journey commenced with promise, marked by the inaugural test flight in 2016 that carried the hopes of bolstering India’s defence capabilities. However, developments have cast a pall of disillusionment over the project, as the armed forces reluctantly conceded to abandoning the endeavour. Despite years of meticulous development efforts, the Tapas BH-201 fell short of the requisite parameters, ultimately failing to meet the operational imperatives set forth.

The decision to shutter Tapas BH-201 as a ‘Mission Mode’ project last September underscores the gravity of the situation. In the lexicon of defence research, a ‘Mission Mode’ project is synonymous with urgency, focus, and unwavering commitment to meeting specific operational mandates. Yet, the faltering trajectory of Tapas BH-201 lays bare the inherent challenges plaguing the DRDO, emblematic of a systemic lack of professionalism and reliability.

A damning critique by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) further illuminates the labyrinthine complexities surrounding DRDO’s project management ethos. The report lambasts the organisation for chronic failures in delivering mission mode projects within stipulated time frames, resulting in egregious time and cost overruns. Shockingly, two-thirds of the projects scrutinised by the CAG veered off course, necessitating time extensions ranging from a modest 16% to a staggering 500%.

The root causes of these delays are manifold, ranging from incessant alterations in design specifications to protracted delays in conducting user trials and procuring essential supplies. The repercussions of these lapses are far-reaching, culminating in the obsolescence of critical assets and a lamentable dependence on imports to mitigate urgent operational exigencies.

The toll of such slipshod project execution is palpable, nowhere more so than in the case of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) project, which languished in limbo despite five years of extended gestation. Even triumphs, such as the successful testing of helicopter-launched anti-tank missiles like HELINA in 2022, are tinged with the spectre of delay and inefficiency.

Perhaps most alarming is the revelation that several projects, ostensibly concluded as successful ventures, were subsequently reincarnated as fresh endeavours, underscoring a disconcerting cycle of mismanagement and redundancy. One of the most significant failure stands since 1982, as GTRE has worked on the indigenous GTX-37 engine for the LCA, later proposing the Kaveri engine in 1986. Despite a Rs 382.86 crore project sanctioned in 1989, GTRE’s efforts, including nine prototype Kaveri engines and extensive testing, failed to meet fighter engine standards.

Why Can’t DRDO become ISRO of Defence?

While this interrogation is valid, it belies a superficial comprehension of the intricate roles and operational environments of these organisations.

The narrative often overlooks the nuanced fabric within which DRDO operates, rooted in the organisation’s genesis in 1958 and its subsequent evolution into a sprawling network of approximately 50 laboratories delving into multifarious domains. Unlike the relatively stable and internally driven milieu of ISRO, DRDO grapples with a nebulous landscape, largely externally defined and rife with uncertainties.

At its core, DRDO’s mandate is crystal clear: to catalyse India’s journey towards self-reliance in critical defence technologies and systems, while simultaneously furnishing the armed forces with cutting-edge weaponry commensurate with strategic imperatives. However, the labyrinthine intricacies of India’s defence planning apparatus, coupled with a dearth of proactive initiatives to delineate the contours of future multi-domain battlefields, present formidable challenges.

In stark contrast, ISRO, since its inception in 1969, has meticulously cultivated its technological prowess, embarking on a trajectory of progressive development underpinned by robust research and development endeavours and strategic partnerships. The agency adeptly navigates its operational sphere, charting missions in alignment with attained technological thresholds, national exigencies, and allocated budgets. Crucially, ISRO enjoys a stable environment wherein the impetus to drive programs forward resides intrinsically within the organisation.

However, the crux of the matter lies in the broader strategic milieu wherein the prerogative of shaping future multi-domain battlefields is often monopolised by technologically pioneering global powers, with India compelled to navigate these contours with strategic acumen. The proximity of such powers to India’s borders further underscores the imperative of a holistic approach towards defence preparedness and technological innovation.

The ability to envisage the contours of future battlefields is tantamount to strategic foresight. Yet, as India grapples with the imperative of sculpting its defence posture for the decades ahead, a paucity of robust strategic research and development frameworks casts a long shadow over the endeavour.

The roadmap ahead is delineated by a tripartite categorization of defence requirements: immediate, near-term, and future. Immediate imperatives, slated for fulfilment within the next two to four years, draw primarily from readily available products. Near-term aspirations, spanning the subsequent five to eight years, find solace in systems already conceived and developed. However, it is the realm of future requirements, envisioned a decade or more hence, that beckons the intervention of organisations like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), private industry, and innovative pioneers.

Yet, the canvas of innovation is riddled with systemic lacunae, chief among them being the dearth of dedicated strategic research laboratories outside the purview of DRDO. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, India’s Army, Air Force, and Navy lack integral research facilities, a deficiency exacerbated by the absence of commensurate structures within major arms industries. Moreover, the nascent orientation of academia towards defence and strategic imperatives, coupled with modest funding allocations, further compounds the challenge.

The Bottom Line

The trio of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and Ordnance Factories has fallen short of the nation’s expectations. What ensues is a narrative rife with half-hearted attempts, false claims, and a palpable deficit of vision.

The crux of the matter lies in the development trajectory of modern tanks and world-class fighter aircraft, endeavours mired in a quagmire of protracted timelines and elusive promises. The arduous journey from prototype conception to combat-ready machines spans not years, but decades – a reality often overlooked in the clamour for instant gratification. The imperative of envisioning a trajectory spanning five decades or more, coupled with a commitment to mid-life upgrades, remains a cornerstone for ensuring the longevity and efficacy of defence platforms.

Yet, the annals of Indian defence production are replete with tales of dashed hopes and unfulfilled promises. The saga of the Arjun tank, birthed by DRDO, and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) by HAL serve as stark examples of the industry’s incompetence. Unrealistic deadlines, perpetually shifting goalposts, and a dearth of tangible accomplishments punctuate their development records, underscoring systemic deficiencies that undermine India’s defence preparedness.

The lamentable absence of real success stories looms large, leaving Indian soldiers bereft of world-class equipment and lamentably inadequate personal weapons. The INSAS rifle, often termed an ‘apology’ for a lethal personal weapon, epitomises the inadequacies plaguing India’s defence arsenal, a stark reminder of the urgent need for transformative reforms.