Pakistan’s growing role as an arms exporter in the Gulf is increasingly intersecting with the deepening strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, particularly as both states pursue competing objectives in Sudan and Libya. As demand for Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter expands, Islamabad is finding it more difficult to compartmentalise defence cooperation from regional geopolitics. According to multiple Pakistani sources familiar with the country’s arms export practices, there is a deliberate effort to avoid supplying weapons to theatres under United Nations embargo, including Sudan and Libya, even through indirect channels involving Gulf partners. These sources indicate that, if compelled to make a strategic choice, Pakistan would lean toward Saudi Arabia. Reporting by Reuters in late December detailed negotiations between Pakistan and Libya’s Benghazi-based Libyan National Army for a multi-billion-dollar defence package that reportedly included JF-17 fighters and Super Mushshak trainers, an arrangement widely understood to depend on third-party financing. Additional Reuters reporting in January outlined discussions over a potential Sudan-related arms package negotiated with Saudi participation, underscoring how Pakistan’s defence industry is becoming embedded in Gulf power competition. Analysts cited by Reuters and regional outlets have consistently linked such prospective deals to Saudi and Emirati strategic priorities rather than purely commercial calculations.
Why the JF-17 Program Amplifies Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma
The JF-17 Thunder, jointly developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, has become central to Islamabad’s export ambitions due to its comparatively low cost and modern capabilities. Reuters and Middle East Eye reporting highlights confirmed exports to Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan, alongside stalled talks with Egypt and Iraq and more promising negotiations with Indonesia and Bangladesh. The platform’s affordability, combined with Chinese avionics and weapons systems and Turkish components such as the Aselpod targeting pod, has widened its appeal across Africa and Asia. However, industrial constraints, reliance on Chinese and Turkish cooperation, and lingering uncertainties in the Russian engine supply chain limit Pakistan’s annual production capacity. Against this backdrop, Islamabad is unlikely to prioritise deliveries to conflict zones under embargo or to clients with contested sovereignty, particularly when such moves risk entangling Pakistan in the Saudi-UAE rivalry. As analysts and officials cited by Reuters and Middle East Eye have noted, Pakistan’s deepening defence ties with Riyadh, formalised through a strategic mutual defence agreement signed in September 2025, and its parallel partnership with Turkey collectively shape a hierarchy of priorities. In practice, Pakistan’s expanding arms portfolio places it squarely within the evolving Saudi–UAE rift, even as it seeks to preserve diplomatic balance and industrial credibility.