The images emerging from the southern Iranian city of Minab have rapidly become one of the most haunting visual records of the modern era of technologically advanced warfare. They show shattered classrooms buried beneath concrete slabs, crushed school desks scattered across dust and rubble, and small backpacks stained dark with blood. Parents kneel beside rows of newly dug graves while funeral processions carry coffins so small they appear almost symbolic of a tragedy that has shocked even veteran observers of modern conflict. Iranian health authorities report that the death toll from the missile strike on the elementary school has surpassed one hundred and sixty five children and adults, the overwhelming majority of them younger than twelve years old, with nearly one hundred additional victims suffering serious injuries.
For seasoned military analysts the horror of the Minab strike is not merely the scale of the casualties but the fact that the United States military had spent years constructing a system designed precisely to prevent such catastrophes. That system now lies largely dismantled following sweeping policy changes implemented under the administration of Donald Trump and the leadership of the defence secretary Pete Hegseth. The dismantling of that framework has triggered deep alarm among former defence officials, legal scholars and international security experts who warn that the United States is abandoning hard learned lessons developed over two decades of war. Among those most profoundly shaken by the Minab images is the former United States Air Force combat veteran and targeting specialist Wes J Bryant. Bryant spent years inside the Pentagon attempting to overhaul the way the United States military plans operations in order to reduce civilian harm. When the photographs of the devastated school circulated online he immediately recognised the nightmare scenario he had spent his career trying to prevent.
Only a year earlier Bryant had been serving as a senior adviser in an ambitious Defence Department initiative aimed at fundamentally reforming how military planners anticipate and mitigate civilian casualties. The programme was built around a newly established institution known as the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence which operated as a central coordination hub for civilian harm mitigation strategies across the armed forces. At the time many analysts believed the United States military had finally begun to take seriously the moral, legal and strategic consequences of civilian casualties in modern warfare. Bryant’s work took place within a broader framework known as Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, commonly referred to inside military circles as CHMR. The initiative represented the first comprehensive attempt to standardise civilian protection procedures across the United States military. Roughly two hundred personnel were assigned to the mission across different commands, including around thirty experts stationed at the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence near the Pentagon.
The programme emerged from a growing recognition that the United States military had repeatedly struggled to prevent civilian deaths during counterterrorism operations conducted since the attacks of 2001. For years critics argued that despite possessing unparalleled precision technology the United States often lacked a systematic framework for assessing civilian risk before launching attacks. The CHMR programme sought to change that reality by embedding civilian protection planning directly into operational decision making. Under the framework military planners were required to conduct detailed analyses of the civilian environment surrounding potential targets. This process involved mapping civilian infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and residential areas while also assessing the daily movements of non combatants. The programme also mandated updates to what military planners call the no strike list which identifies civilian locations that must not be targeted under any circumstances. The framework further required post strike investigations whenever civilian casualties were reported. These investigations were intended to identify operational mistakes and incorporate the resulting lessons into training and planning procedures. In theory the programme would create a feedback loop through which the military continuously improved its ability to avoid civilian harm.
By the time the current administration returned to power the CHMR programme had been integrated into multiple regional commands including the United States Central Command based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, and the United States Africa Command headquartered in Stuttgart Germany. Within these commands harm mitigation advisers worked alongside military planners responsible for some of the most sensitive counterterrorism and intelligence operations conducted by the United States.
Bryant served as a key liaison between the harm mitigation team and special operations commanders. According to internal briefing notes he later presented to congressional staff, senior commanders including Frank Bradley had initially embraced the reforms. Bradley, who at the time led the Joint Special Operations Command before later being promoted to lead United States Special Operations Command, reportedly directed comprehensive reviews of past civilian casualty incidents and ordered changes in operational procedures based on those findings.
The reforms also reflected lessons drawn from previous tragedies that had deeply embarrassed the United States military. One of the most notorious incidents occurred in 2015 when a heavily armed United States gunship repeatedly fired upon a hospital operated by the humanitarian organisation Doctors Without Borders in the Afghan city of Kunduz. The attack lasted for more than an hour and resulted in the deaths of twenty four patients and fourteen medical staff members. Investigations later concluded that a series of technical failures and human errors had led the strike team to mistakenly identify the hospital as a Taliban target. Survivors described scenes of unimaginable horror as patients burned alive in their beds while others were shot as they attempted to flee the building. The administration of Barack Obama apologised for the incident and offered financial compensation to the families of those killed.
Despite the shock generated by the Kunduz disaster similar incidents continued to occur during subsequent military campaigns against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. In March 2017 alone three major civilian casualty events took place within a single week. A drone strike on a mosque in Syria killed roughly fifty people. Another strike hit a school housing displaced families killing forty civilians. In the Iraqi city of Mosul bombing triggered a building collapse that killed more than one hundred people sheltering inside.
These repeated tragedies exposed systemic weaknesses in the military’s targeting procedures. Analysts at the policy research organisation RAND Corporation concluded that commanders often lacked accurate information about civilian conditions on the ground and were too quick to dismiss reports of civilian casualties. The RAND analysis also noted that lessons from past mistakes were rarely incorporated into future planning.
Momentum for reform accelerated following another devastating incident during the chaotic withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan in August 2021. A missile strike in Kabul killed an aid worker along with nine members of his family including seven children. The strike team had incorrectly identified the aid worker’s vehicle as belonging to militants preparing an attack.
In response the defence secretary at the time, Lloyd Austin, publicly apologised and ordered the development of a comprehensive civilian harm mitigation strategy. That directive eventually produced the CHMR action plan formally adopted in 2022.
For a brief period the programme appeared to represent a genuine shift in military culture. Advisers working within the framework described a serious effort backed by a budget of approximately seven million dollars and staffed by specialists with extensive experience in international conflict law and civilian protection. That momentum began to unravel after the new administration returned to power and prioritised a dramatically different strategic philosophy. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth introduced what he described as a doctrine centred on lethality, arguing that excessive legal constraints and bureaucratic oversight weakened the combat effectiveness of United States forces. Critics say the doctrine reflects a broader reorganisation of national security policy around increased aggression and reduced accountability.
According to numerous current and former national security officials the administration lowered the level of authorisation required for lethal operations while expanding the categories of permissible targets. At the same time inspectors general were dismissed and oversight mechanisms weakened. Many officials who spoke about the changes did so only on condition of anonymity due to fears of retaliation. The consequences for the CHMR programme were swift and severe. Roughly ninety percent of the personnel assigned to the mission were removed or reassigned according to former staff members. In many commands a single adviser now remains where teams of specialists once operated. At United States Central Command a team of ten civilian harm mitigation experts has reportedly been reduced to just one.
Although the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence technically still exists, former staff members say it now operates largely in name only. Without a clear mandate, operational mission or budget the centre has effectively been rendered dormant. Meanwhile military operations have intensified dramatically. Conflict monitoring organisations report that the number of United States military strikes conducted worldwide since the beginning of the administration has already exceeded the total number carried out during the entire four year presidency of Joe Biden.
The Iran campaign has produced particularly devastating civilian casualties. The organisation Human Rights Activists News Agency estimates that more than twelve hundred civilians have been killed in United States and Israeli strikes since the conflict began, including nearly two hundred children. Hundreds of additional deaths remain under investigation due to the difficulty of verifying casualties in an environment shaped by internet blackouts and ongoing hostilities.
The strike on the Minab elementary school has become the most controversial incident of the campaign. Several independent investigations suggest the attack was carried out using a Tomahawk cruise missile. Video footage authenticated by the investigative research organisation Bellingcat appears to show the missile striking near the school. Iranian state media later displayed fragments of a United States manufactured Tomahawk recovered at the site. The significance of that discovery is difficult to overstate. The United States remains the only participant in the conflict known to possess Tomahawk cruise missiles. Although the administration has denied responsibility for the attack and suggested it may have been conducted by Iran itself, United Nations human rights experts have called for a full investigation to determine whether the strike constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law.
For experts in the law of armed conflict the central question is whether the attack complied with the fundamental principles of distinction and proportionality which govern the use of force under international law. Military commanders are required to distinguish between combatants and civilians and must ensure that any expected civilian harm is not excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage.
In the Minab case investigators are examining whether the nearby presence of a naval facility belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard may have influenced targeting decisions. The school is located only a short distance from the base and was reportedly once part of the same complex. However maps have identified the building as a school since at least 2013. Former CHMR advisers argue that under the previous framework planners would have conducted detailed assessments months in advance of any potential strike campaign against Iran. These assessments would have included updated no strike lists and real time mapping of civilian infrastructure. If the school had been correctly identified within that system the attack might never have been authorised. The broader strategic implications extend beyond moral outrage. Military strategists have long understood that civilian casualties can undermine the very objectives military campaigns seek to achieve. The retired general Stanley McChrystal famously described the phenomenon through what he called insurgent mathematics. According to his calculation each innocent civilian killed in a military operation can generate at least ten new enemies motivated by anger and revenge. Evidence from multiple conflict zones suggests that this dynamic continues to shape contemporary warfare. In Yemen a recent air strike on a migrant detention centre killed at least sixty one African migrants according to investigations by Amnesty International which concluded the attack may constitute a war crime. In Somalia the number of United States strikes has surged dramatically with reported fatalities rising from one hundred and eighty nine during the final year of the previous administration to as many as three hundred and fifty nine during the first year of the current one.
Researchers such as Alexander Palmer warn that the emerging strategy appears heavily focused on killing suspected militants rather than addressing the underlying conditions that sustain insurgent movements.
For former officials like Wes Bryant the dismantling of the civilian harm mitigation framework represents a profound step backwards in the evolution of modern military ethics. The United States military once sought to present itself as the global standard bearer for adherence to the laws of armed conflict. That reputation, he argues, is now in serious jeopardy.
Bryant has since become an outspoken critic of the administration’s defence policies, warning that a culture of indifference toward civilian casualties can erode the professionalism of the armed forces and weaken the legitimacy of American military operations worldwide. The events in Minab, he believes, may ultimately become one of the defining examples of what happens when the institutional safeguards designed to protect civilian life are dismantled. If independent investigations confirm United States responsibility for the strike on the Minab school the incident could enter the historical record alongside the most controversial targeting failures of the past half century. In the eyes of many international law specialists it would represent not merely an operational mistake but a systemic collapse of the very mechanisms intended to prevent such tragedies.
For the grieving families burying their children in Minab the strategic debates unfolding in Washington and international capitals offer little comfort. What remains is a crater where a school once stood and a haunting question that now echoes far beyond the borders of Iran. In an age of precision guided weapons and advanced surveillance technology how did the world arrive at a moment when an elementary school could once again become the centre of a battlefield.