The US-Israeli military effort against Iran has reached its fourth week of hostilities, while GCC nations’ previously cautious stance towards the conflict is transforming into a potentially much more aggressive approach. A question arises as to whether Washington’s key Arab allies will allow or support their involvement in any means of direct action against Iran as part of a larger war.
Beginning in late February 2026, investing thousands of missiles and drones against GCC territories, the Islamic Republic has launched a significant number of attacks against the Gulf States; according to the most recent estimates, approximately 83% of Iranian attacks are aimed at GCC countries and 17% towards Israel. Strikes against the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Oman have included attacks on energy infrastructure, airports, hotels, and military installations. These attacks have resulted in disruption to the production of oil and liquefied natural gas and have thus shaken up the global energy market.
The GCC condemned Iran’s actions as “blatant” and “criminal” in a joint statement this week, and in it, expressly reserved its rights to use collective self-defence as provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Several GCC nations have also put integrated air and missile defence systems into operation to varying degrees of success, with many systems having successfully integrated into the defence of the region, although cheaper aircraft such as Iranian drones have proven consistently challenging for the GCC to neutralise in terms of their near-simultaneous detection, launching, and execution of strikes against targets within the region.
GCC military forces, who have been given many advanced U.S.-provided systems, can defend themselves well; they cannot strike inside Iran without major U.S. assistance. Currently, the GCC is likely to provide “active defence” to U.S. forces along with logistical support, including basing, overflight rights, and maritime security for operations in the Strait of Hormuz. However, as Iranian attacks are now threatening to disrupt vital infrastructure — including desalination plants, power grids, and oil facilities- Gulf states are losing patience.
The U.S. has much at stake in this region. The GCC countries host important American military assets and provide a large percentage of the world’s crude oil. If tensions between the U.S. and Iran increase and result in additional GCC involvement, the chances of stabilising oil flows from the Gulf increase, while the likelihood of disruptions increases if Iran retaliates by trying to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Administration officials are optimistic that the GCC’s increasingly aggressive posture could serve as a force multiplier, offering the U.S. additional resources to hold Iranian belligerence at bay. On the other hand, GCC leaders continue to emphasise that they were not responsible for escalating this conflict. Whether deterrent capabilities continue to deter or the GCC decides to move to direct retaliation against Iranian actions will depend upon the volume of future Iranian strikes and U.S. and Israeli operations to reduce Iranian military capabilities.