This article offers a glimpse into the complex reasons behind India’s first nuclear test, suggesting that India, striving to protect its own interests in a world where superpowers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued their own goals, managed its challenges well.
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The Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor is a type of nuclear reactor that can use natural uranium as fuel by utilizing heavy water to moderate reactions. This design makes it easier for countries without the means to enrich uranium to start producing nuclear energy. However, this accessibility has sparked controversy due to concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear reactors, including the CANDU, can be used to produce plutonium, which can then be turned into nuclear weapons.
This issue came to the forefront with the Canadian-Indian Reactor, U.S. (CIRUS), a joint project between Canada and the United States to provide India with nuclear technology to help meet its growing energy needs. However, in 1974, nearly 15 years after the CIRUS reactor became operational, India tested a nuclear bomb at their Pokhran test site, using plutonium likely produced by the CIRUS reactor. Despite India claiming the explosion was for “peaceful purposes,” it went against the initial agreement that the technology would not be used for non-peaceful activities. As a result, Canada pulled back its support for India’s nuclear energy program and reevaluated its policy on sharing nuclear technology.
The decision by India to test a nuclear weapon and the reactions that followed involved a complicated mix of political motivations. This paper aims to simplify and explain the reasons behind India’s demonstration of nuclear capability and the subsequent political responses by India and other countries involved.
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In 1954, India laid the groundwork for its nuclear program by setting up the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET), later known as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), named after its founder, Homi Jehangir Bhabha. Bhabha, an Indian nuclear physicist trained in the UK, aimed to focus the centre on nuclear power research, steering clear of developing nuclear weapons. India’s Prime Minister at the time, Jawaharlal Nehru, echoed this sentiment in 1957, assuring Parliament that India had no interest in nuclear bombs, even if it had the capability to make them.
Bhabha, however, saw the potential of using plutonium, a byproduct of nuclear reactors, as a fuel alternative to India’s scarce natural uranium resources. This approach would help India maintain energy independence in the future. The first step in this direction was the construction of the Apsara research reactor, achieved with the UK’s help in providing designs and enriched uranium fuel. The reactor successfully began operations in 1956.
Before Apsara was finished, India began planning to build the CIRUS reactor in 1955, with help from Canada under the Colombo Plan, a program designed to aid the development of Asian and Pacific countries. The United States contributed by providing the heavy water needed for the reactor. Both Canada and the U.S. insisted that any material produced by the reactor should be used only for peaceful purposes, but they didn’t set up a way to check how the plutonium was used.
During this time, India’s relationship with the U.S. started to strain, especially when India went to war with Pakistan and the U.S. refused to provide military support, likely due to Pakistan’s ties with China. India felt sidelined by the major powers, particularly over disagreements regarding the use of its plutonium.
The U.S. became aware of India’s nuclear ambitions by early 1972, after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, predicting a possible nuclear test. A U.S. report noted that the agreement with India didn’t explicitly ban “peaceful nuclear explosions” and admitted that, without inspection rights, the U.S. couldn’t stop India unless it openly announced its plans. India kept its preparations secret and didn’t reveal the nuclear test, named Pokhran-I, until after it occurred, avoiding international pressure.
The decision to conduct the test seems influenced by India’s frustrations with the U.S. during the Indo-Pakistani War. Despite the Soviet Union’s support, the complex dynamics between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union may have made India feel undervalued. The successful test was possibly a move to assert India’s presence on the global stage.
Before India’s nuclear test at Pokhran, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had warned India that such a test would lead to a halt in nuclear cooperation between the two countries. When India went ahead with the test, Canada suspended its nuclear projects in India and brought its personnel home to reevaluate its policy on sharing nuclear technology. Canada’s main concern was the use of its heavy water reactor technology in the test, which contradicted its stance on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The U.S. reaction was more restrained, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger choosing not to react harshly to preserve future relations with India, especially during a time when the U.S. was dealing with the Watergate scandal.
In December 1974, Canada introduced a new policy against nuclear proliferation, demanding assurances that its nuclear technology would not be used in explosive devices, including those for “peaceful” purposes. India, led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, strongly opposed the new terms, arguing it was unfair to change the contract terms after the fact. The disagreement led to a halt in nuclear cooperation, pushing India towards self-reliance in its nuclear program.
In 1996, during discussions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which aimed to ban all nuclear explosions, India again defended its nuclear stance. India criticized the treaty for not demanding disarmament within a specific timeframe and for allowing certain types of non-explosive tests. India saw the CTBT as another tool of non-proliferation that unfairly targeted developing countries and maintained the advantage of countries with established nuclear arsenals. India’s required signature for the treaty’s implementation made them feel particularly targeted.
After maintaining restraint since the 1974 test, India conducted several nuclear tests in 1998, leading Pakistan, which had been in a tense rivalry with India, to conduct its own tests, escalating the nuclear stakes in the region.
This article offers a glimpse into the complex reasons behind India’s first nuclear test, suggesting that India, striving to protect its own interests in a world where superpowers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued their own goals, managed its challenges well. It’s easy to understand the goals of international treaties aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, as they work towards a world without the threat of nuclear conflict. However, for India, adhering to these treaties could mean losing a crucial means of defence without any solid assurance against potential threats.
As global development progresses, the demand for energy will only increase. Given the environmental toll of relying on fossil fuels, the shift towards nuclear energy might become essential for meeting future energy needs. Initially, India’s pursuit of nuclear technology aimed at peaceful energy production, as emphasized by Prime Minister Nehru. However, the close relationship between nuclear energy programs and the potential for weapons development means addressing one invariably involves considerations of the other.
(The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not reflect the editorial stance of Business Upturn)
Mr. Girish Linganna is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany.