In the intricate tapestry of India’s defence apparatus, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) stands as a pivotal pillar, quietly but decisively shaping the nation’s aerial prowess. Yet, beneath its veneer of importance lies a narrative of unmet potential and systemic challenges that threaten to clip the wings of India’s aerospace ambitions.
HAL’s significance in bolstering the operational capabilities of our armed forces cannot be overstated. From the sleek lines of fighter jets to the thunderous roar of helicopter rotors, much of the hardware that defends our skies bears the hallmark of HAL’s craftsmanship. However, lurking behind this façade of productivity lies a concerning dearth of strategic foresight and proactive leadership.
The tale of the HF-24 Marut serves as a poignant reminder of missed opportunities. Conceived as India’s foray into supersonic fighter technology, the Marut ultimately failed to soar to its intended heights. Instead of nurturing and refining the project, bureaucratic inertia and a lack of long-term vision allowed this promising endeavour to wither on the vine, leaving the Indian Air Force bereft of a crucial asset.
While HAL’s track record boasts an impressive array of aircraft, including iconic models like the MiG-21 and the modern Sukhoi-30, the company’s evolution has not always been synonymous with progress. Despite its stature as a manufacturing behemoth, concerns linger regarding the organisation’s ability to keep pace with technological advancements and cultivate a workforce equipped with the requisite skills for the challenges ahead.
At the crux of HAL’s predicament lies a palpable absence of decisive leadership and strategic direction. Without a clear roadmap delineating the trajectory of India’s aerospace industry, HAL finds itself navigating turbulent skies, perpetually at risk of being overtaken by competitors on the global stage.
The repercussions of HAL’s stagnation are acutely felt within the corridors of the Indian Air Force, where a dearth of indigenous aircraft compounds existing challenges stemming from an inadequate fleet size. As geopolitical dynamics evolve and regional security imperatives undergo constant flux, the imperative for a robust and self-reliant aerospace sector becomes increasingly apparent.
In the face of these challenges, the onus falls squarely on policymakers and industry stakeholders to chart a course correction for HAL and the broader aerospace ecosystem. The imperative lies not merely in rectifying past missteps but in fostering an environment conducive to innovation, collaboration, and sustained growth.
The nation’s premier defence establishments, including the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and Ordnance Factories, have failed to deliver on their promises, leaving the country’s military capabilities sorely lacking.
The saga of attempting to develop a modern tank and a world-class fighter jet is fraught with tales of false promises and inflated claims by DRDO and HAL. These endeavours, which demand years of dedicated effort and substantial investment, have fallen short of expectations, languishing in a perpetual cycle of prototyping without achieving true operational readiness.
Our Beloved LCA!
A glaring example of this is the case of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas program. Despite ambitious plans and substantial funding, progress has been sluggish at best. While a significant number of LCAs have been ordered, the pace of development and delivery has been lacklustre, with delays and uncertainties plaguing the project.
The contract signed with HAL for the supply of 83 LCA-Mk1A fighters, touted as a more capable variant, offers a glimmer of hope. However, the timeline for delivery remains murky, with HAL failing to provide a concrete schedule. Moreover, the LCA’s reliance on imported components, including crucial precision-guided munitions and air-to-air missiles, underscores India’s continued dependence on foreign suppliers for key defence capabilities.
Furthermore, the absence of integral electronic countermeasure systems and the persistent lack of an indigenous aero-engine further dampen the prospects of the LCA program. Without these essential components, the operational effectiveness and longevity of the LCA fleet are called into question, raising doubts about its utility in the long run.
The challenges facing the LCA program extend beyond the Air Force, with the status of the Naval Variant LCA program and the Tactical Electronic Warfare Development Establishment (TEDBF) project remaining uncertain. The absence of a clear roadmap for these initiatives raises concerns about India’s ability to maintain a credible naval aviation capability in the years to come.
What about Mk 2?
As of now, the prospect of witnessing the LCA Mk II take to the skies before January 4, 2026, seems increasingly unlikely, marking a significant delay in the program’s progression. Should development proceed without major setbacks, the first operationally capable LCA Mk II may not be a reality until as late as 2036, a sobering realisation for India’s aspirations in indigenous defence production.
While operational specifics of the LCA Mk II remain shrouded in secrecy, certain critical benchmarks must be met for the aircraft to stand toe-to-toe with its adversaries. Chief among these requirements is a production rate of at least 18 aircraft annually, ensuring a steady influx of assets into the Indian Air Force’s arsenal.
Furthermore, the LCA Mk II must be equipped with indigenous weaponry, showcasing India’s self-reliance in defence technology. Essential operational parameters, including a formidable combat radius of at least 500 kilometres and an integral Electronic Countermeasure/Electronic Counter-Countermeasure (ECM/ECCM) suite capable of neutralising advanced airborne threats, are imperative for maintaining air superiority in the region.
Mid-air refuelling capability, compatibility with Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) platforms within the Indian Air Force, and state-of-the-art radar systems, including an indigenous Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar with robust search and track capabilities, are indispensable for ensuring the LCA Mk II’s effectiveness in modern aerial warfare scenarios.
Moreover, the aircraft must boast a user-friendly digital cockpit display, integral Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), and a ‘ZERO/ZERO’ pilot escape system, underscoring the paramount importance of pilot safety in combat operations.
In addition to these prerequisites, advanced features such as Fly-by-Wire (FBW) and Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems, dry regime supersonic capability, and a Thrust-to-Weight ratio exceeding 0.8 under maximum load conditions are essential for elevating the LCA Mk II to the pinnacle of aerial superiority.
For A Reality Check!
Envisioning the likely state of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2036, a sobering reality confronts us: a fleet ageing rapidly, with dwindling squadron strength and a paucity of indigenous capabilities. The fixed-wing strike element, comprising a mix of venerable veterans and relatively newer acquisitions, paints a portrait of challenges and uncertainties.
First and foremost, the venerable MiG-21 variants, stalwarts of the IAF for decades, would have gracefully transitioned into static display platforms, marking the end of an era in Indian aviation history. Meanwhile, the Jaguar fleet, if still in service, would have clocked nearly six decades of service, a testament to their enduring reliability but also a reflection of the challenges posed by ageing platforms.
The MiG-29s and Mirage-2000s, stalwarts of the IAF’s fleet, would be nearing the half-century mark, having served valiantly since their induction in the mid-1980s. Similarly, the Su-30 variants, workhorses of the IAF, would be approaching four decades of service, with potential disruptions in fleet availability due to geopolitical dynamics, as evidenced by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The relatively newer additions to the IAF’s arsenal, such as the Rafales, would be nearing two decades of service, providing a modern but finite window of operational capability. However, despite the induction of these advanced platforms, the overall squadron strength of the IAF is projected to shrink significantly, potentially falling between 22 to 26 squadrons.
Amidst this backdrop of ageing and dwindling assets, the question arises: will the LCA Mk II join the ranks of the IAF by 2036? The answer remains uncertain. While HAL endeavours to develop and equip the LCA Mk II with advanced capabilities, past performance raises doubts about the timely availability and operational readiness of this indigenous platform.
HAL’s track record over the past three decades has been marred by substandard performance and a lack of accountability, casting a shadow over the prospects of achieving self-reliance in defence production. The slogan of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ rings hollow without tangible actions to bolster indigenous capabilities.
The current Chief of Air Staff’s acceptance of the LCA Mk II as an interim measure underscores the urgency of addressing systemic deficiencies within HAL and the broader defence establishment. The path to achieving a robust and self-reliant defence industry requires bold reforms, including the privatisation of HAL and greater accountability for performance and output.
Views expressed in the article are of author’s own and do not reflect the editorial stance of Business Upturn
