Image Credits - Benar News
In the intricate geostrategic chessboard of the Indo-Pacific region, a new move by China has set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. The unveiling of a satellite image depicting a dry dock at the China-built submarine base in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district has drawn the attention of strategic observers across the region. This development, coupled with China’s deepening defence cooperation with Bangladesh, poses a significant challenge to India’s maritime security interests in the Bay of Bengal.
The Pekua Submarine Base: A Dragon’s Lair in the Making
The satellite imagery, released by Damien Symon on the social media platform X, reveals the construction of a dry dock at the Pekua submarine base, inaugurated in December 2023 by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The base, officially named BNS Sheikh Hasina, is a sprawling complex spanning 1.75 square kilometres, funded and developed by China at a staggering cost of $1.21 billion.
Strategically located in Cox’s Bazar, facing the Bay of Bengal, the Pekua base can accommodate six submarines and a few warships. However, Bangladesh’s current submarine fleet consists of only two Chinese-made, refurbished Ming-class Type 035B diesel-electric submarines, acquired in 2016 at a discounted price of $203 million.
The discrepancy between the base’s capacity and Bangladesh’s existing submarine fleet has raised eyebrows among strategic analysts, who suspect that China may have ulterior motives beyond mere defence cooperation.
“This enhanced defence cooperation endeavour by China helps Beijing solidify its presence and influence in the region,” Symon warned in his post, highlighting the potential implications of China’s growing foothold in Bangladesh’s naval infrastructure.
For India, the presence of a Chinese-funded and potentially Chinese-operated submarine base in its immediate maritime neighbourhood is cause for grave concern. The Pekua base’s proximity to strategically important Indian naval bases, including a nuclear submarine base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, raises alarms about the potential for Chinese espionage and surveillance activities.
“The submarine base can easily be used as another espionage outpost by the Chinese navy,” warns a senior Indian defence analyst. “This will make the Bay of Bengal unsafe for India, as the Chinese navy can easily monitor the movement of Indian submarines and warships in the region and Indian naval ships stationed at Indian bases.”
Moreover, the dry dock’s dimensions, estimated to be 135 meters long and 35 meters wide, suggest that it can accommodate larger submarines than the two refurbished Ming-class vessels currently in Bangladesh’s possession. This has fueled speculation that China may seek to expand Bangladesh’s submarine fleet or even station its own submarines at the base under the guise of “anti-piracy operations.”
The Tangled Web of Geopolitics
The Pekua predicament is further complicated by the intricate web of geopolitical dynamics in the region. Bangladesh, under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, has cultivated close diplomatic and economic ties with India. However, her government’s pursuit of closer defence cooperation with China has drawn criticism from domestic political opponents, who accuse her of cosying up to Beijing.
This delicate balancing act between India and China has put Bangladesh at the centre of the Great Game unfolding in the Indo-Pacific region. As one analyst astutely observed, “Bangladesh will thus be embroiled in the Great Game of the Indo-Pacific, where the Bangladesh navy will find itself playing the role of a reserve player from the Chinese side.”
For India, the challenge lies in navigating this complex geopolitical terrain while safeguarding its strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal. While it may be able to exert economic and strategic leverage on smaller nations like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh presents a more formidable challenge, given its growing economic and military ties with China.
As China’s footprint in the Indian Ocean region grows, the Pekua submarine base represents a stark reminder of the need for proactive diplomacy and strategic foresight on India’s part. Analysts argue that India must find ways to either deny China the use of this facility or counter the enhanced presence of Chinese military assets in Bangladesh’s naval bases.
Diplomatic channels must be explored to address concerns over the potential dual use of the Pekua base for Chinese naval operations. Simultaneously, India must fortify its maritime security capabilities in the Bay of Bengal, enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to monitor any potential threats emanating from the Chinese presence.
The Pekua predicament is a wake-up call for India to reassess its regional strategy and strengthen its partnerships with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific. As the great game of power politics unfolds, India’s ability to navigate these treacherous waters will be put to the test, with the nation’s maritime security and regional influence hanging in the balance.
