Indian Peace Keeping Force Operations in Jaffna Peninsula, Sri Lanka

Operation Pawan was India’s effort to bring stability to Sri Lanka’s conflict in 1987. What began as peacekeeping against the LTTE escalated into fierce combat. Despite heavy sacrifices, veterans feel the mission’s legacy is overlooked domestically.

By Col. RS Sidhu

Operation Pawan was India’s challenging mission in 1987 to stabilize Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. It quickly turned into intense combat against the LTTE. Despite significant sacrifices, veterans feel the mission remains underappreciated in India.

10th of October 2024 marks the 37th Anniversary of the commencing of active military operations in 1987 by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, during Operation Pawan.  Seizing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stronghold of the Jaffna peninsula was the focus of military operations by IPKF in October 1987. Before commencing military operations, few had anticipated that October 1987 would turn out to be the bloodiest month for the Indian Peacekeepers in Sri Lanka. This month saw intense combat that mirrored a war-like operational situation, wherein the IPKF suffered nearly 25 per cent of its overall casualties.

India Sri Lanka Agreement

To recall, an India Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) was signed on 29th of July 1987 in Colombo, by Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Shri Julius Jayawardene, the President of Sri Lanka. The Agreement aimed at mitigating the ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka and protecting the Sri Lankan Tamil minority from state-sponsored discrimination. It led to the deployment of the IPKF at the request of the Sri Lankan government for guaranteeing the adherence to the ISLA, by the warring parties; namely, the Sri Lanka security forces and the Tamil militants. 54 Infantry Division of the Indian Army was inducted as the IPKF, on the 29th of July 1987, into the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The military operation was code-named Operation ‘Pawan’.

The ISLA promised greater autonomy and merger of Tamil majority North and East Provinces, within a broad democratic framework under the Sri Lanka constitution. It consisted of political and military clauses which were to be accomplished by not only Sri Lanka and Tamil militant groups but also by India. It required the IPKF military leadership to display political acumen to understand and interpret the clauses, military acumen to accomplish the duties and responsibilities, and diplomatic acumen to navigate the shoals of conflicting interests of the warring parties.

LTTE opposition to the agreement

However, the LTTE leadership looked at itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Sri Lanka Tamils and followed an absolutist and totalitarian ideology. The sharing of political space in a democratic system of governance was an anathema to the political ideology of the LTTE. This dogma propelled them to launch violent fratricidal wars to the finish against other Tamil rebel organisations and validates this reflection.

The supreme leader of the LTTE, V Prabhakaran, the military leader Mahathya, and political ideologue Anton Balasingham were firm in their opinion, that an independent Tamil homeland was the only permanent solution to overcome state-sponsored ethnic repression of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The ISLA fell far short of their political aspirations of an independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. This was the principal reason for the reluctance of the LTTE leadership to wholeheartedly support the ISLA.

The LTTE was a ruthless organisation that indulged in coerced recruitment, reprisals against recalcitrant families, used civilians as human shields, indulged in fratricidal political killings of Tamils, and actively engaged in drugs and arms trafficking from SE Asia to West Asia. It exercised control over the ethnic Sri Lankan Tamil populace through a subtle combination of coercive means and ideological motivation. It also displayed calculated ruthlessness by burning alive captured prisoners, as a psychological weapon to terrorise the opponents. This is also corroborated by the incident where five IPKF soldiers who were on administrative duties were kidnapped from Jaffna town in the first week of October and brutally burnt alive by LTTE cadres in public.

In the first week of August 1987, to wean away the LTTE to openly support the ISLA, the LTTE supremo V Prabhakaran and his family were escorted in an Indian Air Force AN 32 aircraft to Palaly airfield in Jaffna. Thereafter, they were moved under heavy escort of IPKF personnel to the Jaffna University.

But right from the onset, even after the return of V Prabhakaran, the LTTE never intended to surrender their weapons. They saw the coming rift with IPKF and did not give access to the IPKF leadership and troops to their camps. By the end of September 1987, it was clear that the LTTE and the other Tamil militant groups were playing truant in surrendering their full cache of weapons and military equipment.

Peacekeeping to peace enforcement

On the night of 2nd / 3rd October 1987, 17 cadres of the LTTE, including Pulendran (Lt Col), their Batticaloa region commander, and Kumarappa (Lt Col), commander of Trincomalee region, were apprehended by the Sri Lankan Navy in the Palk Strait off Jaffna coastline, while clandestinely transporting a large illegal consignment of weapons and ammunition by boats. They were brought to Palaly airfield, the main air base of SLA(Sri Lankan Army)  in the Jaffna Peninsula, pending transfer to Colombo for further action.

The LTTE insisted that all its cadres were protected from arrest under the provision of a general amnesty granted under para 2.11 of the Indo SLA, and approached the 54 Infantry Division to get their cadres released from SL Army custody. The SLA was equally adamant that carrying weapons was a breach of the provision of surrender of all weapons and ammunition by the militant groups under para 2.9 of the ISLA, and that the militants were arrested as common criminals outside the jurisdiction of IPKF.

54 Infantry Division referred the matter to higher Indian authorities, who in turn directed them to prevent the transfer of prisoners to Colombo till a final decision was arrived at.

Firm intervention of the Indian army ensured periodic access by Indian Army doctors to the LTTE prisoners to monitor their health. SLA was also persuaded by the Indian Army to permit an LTTE delegation led by their military commander Mahathya to meet with the prisoners.

However, the situation tensed further on 4th October 1987, in the afternoon, when a Sri Lankan Air Force plane landed at the Palaly airfield to ferry the prisoners to Colombo the next day.

The LTTE set the deadline of the afternoon of 5th October 1987 for the release of their cadres. Realising that their transfer was now imminent, the 17 prisoners consumed cyanide in the early evening of the same day.  Five prisoners were saved through resuscitation attempts by the Indian Army. The other 12, including Pulendran and Kumarappa, died.

The LTTE leadership used this incident as an excuse to declare hostilities against the IPKF.

Full-scale hostilities

Sensing the imminence of hostilities, additional Infantry Brigades and units began arriving piecemeal to reinforce the 54 Infantry Division. In a short timeframe, 72 Infantry Brigade, 41 Infantry Brigade, 18 Infantry Brigade and 115 Infantry Brigade were inducted into Jaffna to bolster the operations of 54 Infantry Division. The reinforced Infantry Division employed five Infantry Brigades, supported by Mechanised Infantry Battalion and an Armoured Squadron, to destroy and evict LTTE from the Jaffna peninsula.

The IPKF opened full-scale hostilities against the LTTE on the night of 10/11 October 1987 by executing an audacious but weakly planned coup de main heliborne mission, employing a Team of 10 Para Commando and advance elements of 13 Sikh LI, to neutralise the Headquarters of the LTTE assessed to be located in Jaffna University.

The five Infantry Brigades were deployed along five road axes to overwhelm Jaffna’s defences. 41 Infantry Brigade moved along the Manipay – Jaffna Road axis to link up with troops at Jaffna Fort. 91 Infantry Brigade secured the Kankesanthurai – Chunakam – Jaffna axis. 72 Infantry Brigade advanced on the Palaly – Urampirai axis to reach Jaffna University. 18 Infantry Brigade operated on the Velvettithrai – Kopai – Jaffna axis to seize Puttur. 115 Infantry Brigade advanced along Point Pedro – Meesalai road towards Chavakacheri. 47 Infantry Brigade was employed to block the Kodikamam – Elephant Pass – Killinochi – Vavuniya axis, the main communication artery between Jaffna and mainland Sri Lanka.

Marthanamadan, Jaffna University, Urampirai, Kopai North, Kopai South, 5 Star Junction, Urelu, Kondavil, Kokuvil, Manipay, Puttur, Jaffna Fort, Chavakacheri were some of the localities which witnessed heavy action. The LTTE had heavily fortified built-up areas along the axis of movement, and extensively employed Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to resist the advance by IPKF units and formations.

By the end of October 1987, after intense operations extending over three weeks, the 54 Infantry Division succeeded in breaking the LTTE stranglehold over the Jaffna peninsula. The militant organisation was unable to sustain the severe casualties inflicted by the IPKF and was forced to fall back to its secret bases deep inside the Vanni jungles in Vavuniya, South of Jaffna. In its efforts to speed up the operations to seize the Jaffna peninsula in the earliest possible time frame, the IPKF too suffered heavy casualties.

Legacy of Operation Pawan

Operation ‘Pawan’ is a testament to India’s commitment to regional peace and stability.  Post-October 1987, Operation Pawan was expanded to become the largest joint services military operation conducted overseas by India, a 32-month campaign from July 1987 to March 1990. Over and above 54 Infantry divisions deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, three additional formations, 4 Infantry Division, 36 Infantry Division, and 57 Mountain Division were inducted into Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa regions, respectively. It led to the establishment of Headquarters IPKF, a Corps-size tri-service organisation with nearly 100,000 troops from the three services under its command.

The human cost of Operation Pawan was enormous. 1,172 Indian soldiers were killed in action (KIA), and more than 3,500 were gravely wounded. Hundreds of wives rendered widows, children left fatherless, and parents left without support in old age.

The IPKF’s bravery was recognised with 1 Param Vir Chakra, 6 Maha Vir Chakras, 98 Vir Chakras, and countless other gallantry awards.

Despite these sacrifices, the operation remains underappreciated on home soil. There is a sense of profound injustice felt by veterans and families of the fallen alike. Unlike the 1971 Indo-Pak War and the Kargil conflict, Operation ‘Pawan’ has not received the same level of official commemoration at the National War Memorial in New Delhi. The absence of such recognition is a source of profound hurt for the veterans who served, as well as the families who lost their loved ones in the line of duty.

Adding to their anguish is the fact that while Sri Lanka has honoured these soldiers by erecting a prominent war memorial in Colombo, India—on whose behalf they made the ultimate sacrifice—has failed to extend similar public tribute. Some of the graves of Indian soldiers who died during the operation still lie in Sri Lanka, further compounding the sense of neglect that surrounds their memory. The recent month-long celebration of the Walong Battle of the 1962 War is a pointer to the fact that we can put the past behind us and commemorate our braves of OP PAWAN too.

Veterans commemorate the braves of IPKF on their initiative on 20 Apr 2024 at NWM, New Delhi. This was the fourth such commemoration.  

In the words of the war veterans, “The greatest irony is that while our sacrifices are acknowledged and respected by Sri Lanka, our own Government and military leadership have shown a remarkable apathy to commemorate the lives of the 1,172 soldiers killed in action during Operation ‘Pawan’.”

They expressed hope that the Government of India will rectify this long-standing oversight and honour the fallen by instituting an official annual remembrance at the National War Memorial, ensuring their legacy is preserved for future generations.

About The Author

Col RS Sidhu, Sena Medal is an Operation ‘Pawan’ veteran, strategic thinker, author, avid practitioner of yoga and deep meditation, and is happiest undertaking offbeat adventure activities. His write-ups on strategic affairs are published in magazines and journals, and can also be accessed at his blogspot www.valleysandvalour.blogspot.com