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The Persian Gulf region has consistently held a prominent position in the broader U.S. foreign security strategy since the conclusion of World War II. A key objective for the United States in the Gulf is to ensure a continuous and affordable supply of oil in sufficient quantities to meet its own needs and those of its allies. Additionally, the U.S. aims to prevent any hostile foreign or regional powers from gaining control or influence in the area. To realize these objectives, the U.S. has established a series of alliances, security partnerships, and arms agreements with the Gulf states.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States equipped the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states with advanced weaponry and provided training to enhance their ability to safeguard their territorial integrity and political interests, particularly against perceived threats from Iran and Iraq.
The Gulf region’s substantial reserves of oil and natural gas have rendered it globally significant, holding approximately 60% of the world’s proven petroleum reserves. This resource is crucial for the world economy, and the strategic location of the Gulf as a major shipping route between the East and West further amplifies its importance. The proximity to Russia adds an extra layer of geopolitical significance for the United States.
During the Cold War, U.S. security policy in the Gulf primarily focused on containing and countering the influence of the Soviet Union, radical nationalists, and left-wing movements in the region, as they were deemed the main threats to regional security and U.S. interests. Post-Cold War, following the Gulf War victory against Iraq, the perceived major threats shifted to Iran and Iraq. The “dual containment” policy aimed to weaken both countries militarily, politically, and economically. However, this strategy encountered challenges, particularly in Iran, where the Clinton Administration sought to normalize relations, especially following the rise of reformists led by President Khatami in Tehran in 1997.
Cold War
From the Truman Administration to the Reagan Administration, American policy objectives in the Gulf region were guided by a three-fold strategy. Firstly, it aimed to contain and counter Soviet political and military influence in the area. This approach was prompted by the Iranian crisis of 1946 and Stalin’s aggressive actions towards Iran, which heightened concerns about Soviet expansion. To achieve containment, the United States looked to the northern-tier nations, such as Turkey and Iran, as crucial allies.
The second goal was to ensure access to the Gulf’s oil supply. The significance of Gulf oil and the need to secure a steady and reliable source led to a proactive stance in safeguarding American interests in the region. This was particularly evident during the Truman Administration, which, in response to the Iran crisis, adopted a tougher stance against Stalin’s ambitions.
Lastly, a key element of U.S. policy in the region was to prevent any threat to Israel’s security from emerging in the Gulf. The strong friendship between the United States and Israel, initiated by President Truman’s support for the creation of the Jewish state in 1946 and subsequent recognition in 1948, became a crucial factor in shaping American policy in West Asia and the Gulf. The recognition of Israel was influenced, in part, by political considerations and a desire to garner support from the Jewish community.
Overall, the Truman Administration, and subsequent administrations up to Reagan, were driven by the imperative to counter Soviet influence, ensure access to Gulf oil, and protect Israel’s security interests in the Gulf region. This was reflected in policies such as the Truman Doctrine, military facility agreements, and a consistent commitment to preserving pro-Western regimes in the area
During President Eisenhower’s tenure, U.S. policy in West Asia underwent a nuanced transformation characterized by a shift away from direct military intervention while reaffirming an assertive ideological interpretation of containment. Eisenhower, who assumed office in 1953, significantly increased American involvement in the region, introducing new guidelines for U.S. policy after 1952.
The roots of this shift can be traced back to the 1951 nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Company by Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq. In response, Western oil companies, including those from the United States, boycotted Iranian oil distribution. The perceived threat to regional stability and national interests led the U.S. and the UK to collaborate in orchestrating a coup in 1953, replacing Mossadeq with the Shah of Iran. This episode illustrated America’s willingness to employ coercion to shape the internal policies of the region, particularly concerning oil-related interests.
Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. actively sought to establish security alliances with Gulf regional powers as part of its global strategy. Supporting the formation of the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO in 1958) in 1955, the U.S. allied with Iran. The pact aimed to foster political and military cooperation among signatories and provide for collective defence in case of an attack on a member state.
Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1956, the U.S. adopted a more direct interest in West Asian affairs, driven by concerns about Soviet influence in the region. President Eisenhower articulated the need for the U.S. to fill the existing vacuum in the Middle East before the Soviet Union could exert its influence. This marked a continuation of the containment policy, emphasizing U.S. commitment to preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the region through strategic partnerships and active involvement in regional affairs.
The Eisenhower Doctrine, introduced in January 1957, aligned with preceding policies and aimed to curb the growth and spread of Arab nationalism and radical forces perceived as indicators of increasing Soviet influence in the West Asian region. The doctrine asserted that the United States should be ready to employ its armed forces to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of states requesting aid against overt armed attacks and aggression from any country controlled by international communism. This commitment underscored the strong determination of the U.S. to use armed force if necessary to eliminate Soviet influence in the Gulf region.
During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, U.S. security policy in West Asia faced challenges as events in Southeast Asia, particularly the Vietnam War, took precedence. Limited attention was directed towards the Gulf region due to the extensive American involvement in Vietnam. Nevertheless, significant arms aid and assistance were provided to friendly Gulf states throughout the 1960s.
The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 represented a departure from previous U.S. policies. Seeking to avoid a recurrence of the Vietnam Syndrome, the Nixon Administration advocated the use of regional surrogate states instead of direct American involvement to protect U.S. interests. The doctrine emphasized building and strengthening the military capabilities of American allies in the region who shared their interests and objectives with the United States. The twin-pillar system established close ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, ensuring a balance of security responsibilities in the region. The Nixon Administration’s strategy involved providing military and economic assistance to pro-Western states in the Gulf, with Iran assuming principal responsibility for ensuring regional security. This approach assured U.S. allies in the region of comprehensive assistance, including military aid, in the face of any perceived threat or aggression.
The oil embargo of 1973 served as a stark reminder of the potential vulnerability of oil supplies from the Gulf region. Some analysts suggest that the United States contemplated the option of military action to secure the flow of oil, with President Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, discussing the feasibility of a military operation to protect Middle East oilfields. However, there is limited evidence to suggest that any attempt was made to seize and control these oilfields. Instead, the U.S. primarily relied on diplomatic efforts to address the 1973 oil crisis.
The late 1970s brought significant political changes to the Gulf region, notably with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 leading to the fall of the Shah, a key figure in the U.S.-led Gulf security arrangement. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the same year brought Communist influence closer to the Gulf than it had been since the 1950s. Simultaneously, the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accord in 1978 between Israel and Egypt contributed to mitigating the threat of Arab nationalism to Israel.
In response to these geopolitical shifts, President Jimmy Carter announced a new strategy in January 1980 to secure U.S. vital interests in the Gulf, known as the Carter Doctrine. In this doctrine, he asserted that any external effort to dominate the Persian Gulf region would be viewed as an attack on the crucial interests of the United States and would be resisted using any required means, including the use of military force.
The Carter Doctrine aimed to restore American political leverage, secure cooperation from regional states, counter growing Soviet influence, contain the impact of the Iranian Revolution and encourage improved relations between Arabs and Israelis. It also signalled the potential for direct U.S. intervention in the Gulf, with the threat of using all means, including nuclear weapons, to protect the region from adversaries. To operationalize this doctrine, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established in February 1980, subsequently evolving into the Central Command (CENTCOM) in January 1983.
President Carter characterized the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an “offensive act” driven by historical and ideological ambitions, particularly aiming at achieving regional domination in the Gulf. The formulation of the Carter Doctrine and the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) were responses designed to deter a direct Soviet intervention in Iran. The shift in U.S. policy reflected a perceived change in Soviet motives rather than merely responding to growing Soviet capabilities.
The Carter Doctrine marked a significant change not only in security policy toward the Gulf but also in the reassessment of U.S. regional priorities and global military commitments. The Gulf region assumed direct control and protection by the United States, gaining new importance in U.S. global security policy. The immediate objective was to establish a credible American military capability in West Asia, with the defence and security of the Gulf deemed a “vital interest” to the United States, a stance that subsequent U.S. presidents did not seek to alter.
The Reagan Administration reaffirmed the Carter Doctrine, aligning its goals with the Truman Doctrine and committing to respond in any necessary manner to prevent Soviet geopolitical presence in the Gulf. This involved supporting the Afghan Mujahideen through the supply of sophisticated weapons and coercive actions against Iran to weaken it militarily, politically, and economically.
The Gulf War of 1990-91 further transformed the regional landscape, with President Bush viewing the region as a “nerve centre” vital to the industrialized Western economies. Control of Gulf oil, seen as crucial for both economic and military power, became a focal point. The Gulf’s oil resources were recognized as not only essential for the developed world’s economic sustenance but also as a key element of military strength. Denying access to Gulf oil would pose a significant threat to the security and economies of Western industrialized countries.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the U.S.-led Coalition force in the Gulf War, the United States established unparalleled dominance in the region. With no strong external rivals, the U.S. maintained its standing power in the Gulf, a situation that persisted until the recent past with no immediate signs of change.